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COMMENTS
holding that the mutilation of a check constitutes a conversion
thereof are situations in which the drawee bank paid the pro-
ceeds to a forger, it is equally true here that the bank might be
said to have handled the check in a manner so inconsistent with
the rights of the owner, the payee, that it converted it.
Many cases hold that only some of the acts of the bank in this
case complete payment. The bank, if it had obeyed the drawer's
order, might have been rendered liable to the payee for conver-
sion. For these reasons, the Supreme Court of Minnesota should
have held that the check had been paid.
JACK L. PIERSON
INSURANCE-CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY BY WILL
In the fall of 1944, the insured, an RAF airman stationed in
Canada, executed his last will and testament. One of the stipula-
tions in the will was that all of his property, including insurance,
should go to his grandmother if he should die unmarried. The
insured had been divorced by his wife several months prior to
the execution of the will. He held two life insurance policies,
and in each of these his former wife was the named beneficiary.
The policies reserved to the insured the right to change bene-
ficiaries, provided that he complied with certain formalities.'
It was conceded that the deceased made no attempt to effect a
change of beneficiary other than by his will. In December, 1944,
the insured was lost at sea in the line of duty, and shortly there-
after was declared dead. The named beneficiary brought an
action for declaratory judgments against the grandmother and
the two insurance companies. The insurance companies, as in-
terpleaders, conceded liability and paid the respective amounts
of the policies into court. The trial court gave judgment for the
grandmother, but this was reversed on appeal 2 and judgment
entered for the ex-wife. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed
the latter judgment by a four-to-three decision. 3
The majority of the court concluded that the named beneficiary
was entitled to the proceeds. They reached this conclusion by
1. The opinion does not disclose the formalities required. Generally, such
policies provide for a change of beneficiary upon written request to the
insurer. The change is then to take effect when indorsements are made
on the policy by the insurer and the insured.
2. Glenn v. Stephens, 44 Ohio 0. 476, 92 N.E.2d 29 (1950).
3. Stone v. Stephens, 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E.2d 766 (1951).
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the following reasoning: the insured's will was of no effect while
he lived; also, during his life there was a total failure to comply
with the formalities required for a change of beneficiary; there-
fore, nothing occurred during the deceased's life which could
operate to divest the named beneficiary of her interest in the
proceeds of the policies. In denying the attempted testamentary
change, the majority felt that certainty as to the beneficiary
would be achieved and that promptness of payment of life
insurance proceeds would thereby be encouraged. These objec-
tives were deemed more desirable from a public policy viewpoint
than a carrying out of the precise wishes of the insured.
The dissenting opinions reasoned that the change by will
should be given effect as the latest expression of the insured's
intent.4
When the life insurance policy reserves to the insured the right
to change the beneficiary, what is the interest of the named
beneficiary? Some courts have said that the named beneficiary
has a vested interest, subject to defeasance. This interest then
ripens into an absolute right to the proceeds upon the death of
the insured.5 A far larger number of courts, Ohio included,
describe the interest of the named beneficiary as "contingent,"
"inchoate," or "expectant." This right then vests6 upon the
death of the insured.7 Similarly, a legatee's interest under a will
vests upon the death of the testator.8 In this Ohio case, then,
the interests of the two contestants crystallized at the same
split-instant of time. When two such simultaneously-vesting
claims are in conflict, which ought to prevail? Further, will a
4. Courts have often expressed their willingness to effectuate an insured's
intent with respect to the recipient of the proceeds. Glen v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 73 Ohio App. 452, 56 N.E.2d 951 (1943). Cf., Texas Co. v. Xavier, 54
F. Supp. 722, 727 (1944) involving the designation of a beneficiary of stock
shares purchased under an employee's stock subscription plan. Contra:
2 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA oF IxsuRANCE LAw § 315, "1... nor is a mere intention
to change the beneficiary sufficient .... "
5. Strachan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 321 Mass. 507, 73 N.E.2d
840 (1947); Tyler v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 226 Mass. 306, 115
N.E. 300 (1917); Barbin v. Moore, 85 N.H. 362, 159 Atl. 409 (1932). Cf.
Parks' Ex'rs v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435, 156 S.W.2d 480 (1941), which terms
the beneficiary's interest ". .. a right subject to be defeated by the exercise
of the reserved power or the lapsing of the policy."
6. 2 CoucH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 825.
7. When courts speak of a present, vested interest, is the beneficiary
in a stronger position than when the interest is termed contingent or
expectant? It is apparently more difficult to designate a new beneficiary
-when the interest is described as presently vested. 19 A.L.R.2d 28 (1951).
8. 2 PAGS, LAW OF WILLs §§ 938, 1586 (3d ed. 1941).
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decision for one or the other of the claimants visit any hardship
on the insurance company? Ought the court disregard the
terms of the contract and give effect to the deceased's intent as
expressed in his duly executed will? These are some of the im-
portant questions raised by the principal case.
There is a paucity of cases involving similar factual situations.
Although the decisions are too few in number to permit the state-
ment of a well-defined majority rule, most of the cases thus far
have not allowed a change of beneficiary by will.9 In denying the
attempted testamentary change, the courts have relied heavily
on the policy factor of prompt and expeditious payment of in-
surance proceeds. However, a relatively recent Arkansas deci-
sion10 has upheld the claim of the legatee upon facts nearly
identical with those of the principal case. The ratio decidendi of
the Supreme Court of Arkansas was that the intent of the in-
sured should prevail. Its opinion is extensively quoted in the
dissent in the principal case.
There have been other cases in which a testamentary change
of beneficiary has been allowed.1 However, these have most fre-
quently involved either policies payable to the estate of the in-
sured or policies reserving the right to change the beneficiary
without regulating the mode of change.'12 Such cases are too
dissimilar from the Stone case to merit any treatment within the
confines of this comment.
When policies have prescribed certain formalities as to the
manner of change, courts have been not at all consistent in
determining when an insured has effectively designated a new
beneficiary. Some jurisdictions require that there be strict com-
pliance with the prescribed manner of designating a new bene-
ficiary. However, the majority of states, Ohio included, 13 hold
9. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 307 Ill. App. 652, 30 N.E.2d 927(1941) ; Bennett v. Bennett, 70 Ohio App. 187, 45 N.E.2d 614 (1942);
Wannamaker v. Stroman, 167 S.C. 484, 166 S.E. 621 (1932).
10. Pedron v. Olds, 193 Ark. 1026, 105 S.W.2d 70 (1937). But see
Grismore, Changing the Beneficiary of a Life Insurance Contract, 48
MICH. L. IRv. 591, 601 (1950), wherein it is stated that the decision of
the Pedron case is contra to the decisions of most courts to which this
factual situation has been presented.
11. See 43 A.L.R. 573 (1926) for extensive collection of cases on this
point.
12. See 2 CoucH, op. cit. supra note 4, § 318 and cases collected therein.
13. Atkinson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 114 Ohio St. 109, 150 N.E.
748 (1926) ; Arnold v. Newcomb, 104 Ohio St. 578, 136 N.E. 206 (1922).
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that by substantial compliance the insured can effect a change
of beneficiary.14 No change, then, has been allowed without
either complete or substantial adherence to the necessary pro-
cedures, unless some unique set of circumstances has rendered
compliance impossible.'5 The Arkansas decision is, of course,
a notable exception.
There exists a hopeless amount of confusion regarding whom
the provisions regulating change are designed to protect. Per-
haps the most reasonable explanation is that advanced by Pro-
fessor Grismore in a recent article contained in the Michigan
Law Review. 6 It is therein stated that the formalities for change
are not primarily designed as protection for either the benefici-
ary or the insurer. Rather, he says, they are intended to provide
assurance of the authenticity of the insured's desire to designate
a new beneficiary. Professor Grismore thinks that the only
problem is the determination of whether there has been compli-
ance sufficient to furnish authentic evidence of the insured's
desire to effect a change. It is only one step beyond Professor
Grismore's view to reason that there is no need to insist on any
degree of compliance with formalities. When the insured has,
in some other manner, furnished clear and trustworthy evidence
of his wish to name a new beneficiary, that should be sufficient.
If a will can provide such authentic evidence of the insured's
-wishes, then the reason for satisfying the formalities has
atrophied.
It is often said that when the insurance company, after the
death of the insured, does not insist upon compliance with the
formalities, there is a "waiver" of that which was intended to
protect the insurer.'7 The use of the word waiver is perhaps
14. 2 COUCH, op. cit. supra note 4, § 315a and authorities therein cited.
15. When compliance with formalities has been rendered impossible by
circumstances beyond the insured's control and when the insured has clearly
expressed his desire to designate a new beneficiary, the desired change may
be effected. See Finnerty v. Cook, 118 Colo. 310, 195 P.2d 973 (1948). It
is submitted that perhaps the grandmother in the instant case might have
successfully pleaded impossibility as an excuse for the insured's failure
to comply with the stipulated methods of change. The insured was in the
RAF, and it was time of war. As a matter of conjecture, it might have
been impossible for the insured to follow the normal, prescribed methods
for change.
16. Changing the Beneficiary of a Life Insurance Policy, 48 MIcii. L.
Rav. 591, 597 (1950).
17. Sun Life Assur. Co. v. Secoy, 72 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. Ohio 1947);
Atkinson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 114 Ohio St. 109, 150 N.E. 748
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unfortunate. The company is not really waiving anything at all.
The insurer is in the position of a disinterested stakeholder.
It merely recognizes that there are conflicting claims to the
proceeds and asks that the court decide which of the real parties
in interest is possessed of the superior right. The insurer's act
of interpleader should have no effect on the subtantive rights of
the claimants. In making its award, the court should consider
only the acts of the insured.
Suppose the court would allow the testamentary change of
beneficiary. Are there any foreseeable, undesirable effects?
Might the insurance company be subjected to double liability?
It seems clear that if the company pays the named beneficiary
without notice of the will, it would not be held liable to the
legatee." In paying to the named beneficiary, it will have com-
pletely complied with the terms of its contract.19 No more could
be expected of it. If, on the other hand, the company has notice
of a will, it can protect itself by paying the proceeds into court,
By interpleader, the insurer concedes liability to whoever might
be the rightful claimant and leaves to the court the responsibility
of determining who that person might be.
It is conceivable that the allowance of a testamentary change
would stimulate additional litigation. Once it were established
that, formalities notwithstanding, claims to insurance proceeds
by persons other than formally designated beneficiaries might
be validated, payment to the named beneficiary might be con-
tested in many more instances than at present. However, the
possibility of increased litigation should not, of itself, be of much
weight in deciding for or against an attempted testamentary
change. It is the court's responsibility to resolve the threat of a
potential deluge without denying recourse to those individuals
possessed of claims which need adjudication.
If testamentary changes of beneficiary were allowed, one
might reasonably suppose that additional uncertainty would be
(1926). 2 APPL-MAN, INSURANCE L & P 464, 469 (1941); Grismore, supra
note 10, at 595.
18. Certainly no cases have been found in which the company was held
liable after it had either paid the proceeds to the named beneficiary or had
interpleaded.
19. If a legatee be found entitled to the proceeds after the company
has in good faith paid the named beneficiary, then the legatee should
logically be able to recover the payment from the named beneficiary.
Again, the action of the insurer should have no effect on the rights of the
parties claiming the proceeds.
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created.20 Whether this would be burdensome is highly conject-
ural. The courts have correctly emphasized the desirability of
prompt and expeditious payment of life insurance proceeds.2 1
But some courts have said that since the insurance company
might be fearful of subsequent liability to a legatee, it might
delay payment to the named beneficiary.22 However, we have
already reasoned that such double liability is unlikely, and the
companies presumably would reason similarly. Therefore, it is
submitted that the uncertainty factor has been overstated by
some courts.
If the court, in the absence of any compliance with formalities,
does decide for the legatee, the insurance contract itself would
be emasculated. Assuredly, the courts should, in general, uphold
the binding character of valid contracts. Those situations in
which contracts are voided or rendered nugatory ought to be
carefully scrutinized. However, an individual purchasing life
insurance certainly is not in a position to bargain with the
company. What method he may use for changing the beneficiary
is almost wholly within the dictates of the insurer. Here the
insured had clearly indicated his desire to alter the contract of
insurance, and the insurer was amply aware of that fact. Query:
Do these facts justify setting aside the contract?
When the question of a testamentary change of beneficiary has
been presented, the courts have followed one of two divergent
theories. The first, restated by the majority of the court in the
Stone case, is based on the necessity for compliance with the
contractually defined procedures. The second, as espoused by the
dissenting judges in the principal case, is that the insured's
expressed intent ought to control the payment of the proceeds.
It is the writer's view that the latter approach would have
reached the better result on the facts presented by the Stone
case. The purpose of the contract provisions regulating a change
of beneficiary and the lucid expression of the insured's desire
for a change are deemed to defeat the argument of the majority.
HERBERT A. MACK
20. Even at present, there exists uncertainty as to the payee, for upon
an insured's death an insurance company must always be prepared for the
claims of hitherto undisclosed assignees of the insurance proceeds.
21. Wannamaker v. Stroman, 167 S.C. 484, 166 S.E. 621 (1932) contains
a representative statement of the uncertainty issue.
22. Parks' Ex'rs v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435, 156 S.W.2d 480, 483 (1941);
Stone v. Stephens, 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E.2d 766 (1951) ; Wannamaker
v. Stroman, 167 S.C. 484, 166 S.E. 621 (1932).
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